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SECURITY DETENTION, TERRORISM AND THE PREVENTION
IMPERATIVE*
John P. McLoughlin,† Gregory P. Noone‡ & Diana C. Noone§
[T]he Government’s regulatory interest in community safety can, in
appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual’s liberty interest.
For example, in times of war or insurrection, when society’s interest
is at its peak, the Government may detain individuals whom the Government believes to be dangerous. Even outside the exigencies of war,
we have found that sufficiently compelling governmental interests can
justify detention of dangerous persons.

—United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987)
The events of September 11 transformed the mission of the Department of Justice . . . . Indeed, the protection of our national security
and the prevention of terrorist acts are our number one goal. On
every level, we are now committed to a new strategy of prevention.

—U.S. Department of Justice
Counterterrorism White Paper
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INTRODUCTION
Since the events of September 11, 2001, the United States and many
of its allies in the global campaign against terrorism have adopted a new
dominant security imperative: prevention of terrorist attacks against their
homelands and national interests. In succinct terms, the prevention imperative posits that the U.S. will engage all elements of national power (legal,
economic, diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, and information) to
neutralize the threat posed by al Qaeda and other non-state actors. Detention
of suspected terrorists has become a main facet of this prevention strategy,
and several legal mechanisms have been employed in this regard in the U.S.
The primary purpose of this article is neither to assess the rectitude
or efficacy of the current multi-prong approach to detention of suspect individuals, nor to assess the imperative placed on prevention as a strategy. Rather, this article will review the recent calls for a new system of preventive
detention and the legal landscape of preventive detention in the U.S., and
will survey several preventive detention systems used by the U.S.’s allies.
The goal of the article is to outline the likely characteristics of, and fundamental questions associated with, any new security detention process the
U.S. might consider adopting.
At the outset, this article is written with certain premises in mind.
First, terrorism experts agree that the U.S. homeland likely will be the target
of future attacks. Second, it is also likely that at some future point those
attacks will be perpetrated by homegrown individuals, including U.S. citizens.1 Third, the design of any system of preventive detention should be
consistent with the U.S.’s obligations under both the U.S. Constitution and
international law. Finally, it is better to discuss the controversial issue of
preventive detention in a calm and deliberate manner rather than in the
wake of another terrorist attack, when fear, anger, and calculations of political advantage may rule the day.
I. THE CURRENT APPROACH TO DETENTION OF TERRORIST SUSPECTS
The United States currently uses a multi-prong approach to detain
suspected terrorists. As former Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez acknowledged, to many outsiders the U.S. government’s decision-making
process about how to deal with a particular individual “is a black box that
raises the specter of arbitrary action,” despite what he described as “a

1

Timothy McVeigh’s 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City has already demonstrated this reality.
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thoughtful, deliberate and thorough analysis of the relevant facts and law at
many levels of the Executive branch.”2
One of the legal mechanisms that the U.S. has employed to detain
suspects is traditional criminal law enforcement, which the U.S. has relied
on to investigate and prosecute both terrorism-specific and other crimes.
This reliance on criminal law enforcement procedures principally has involved the “material support” statutes found at 18 USC §§ 2339A and
2339B. More ordinary offenses such as conspiracy, document fraud, obstruction of justice, perjury, and the like also have played a critical role.3
This criminal law enforcement element of the prevention strategy has been
used with respect to both U.S. citizens and aliens, and persons apprehended
both in the U.S. and in foreign nations. The U.S. has employed other tools
from the law enforcement paradigm more aggressively to neutralize perceived terrorist threats. Perhaps the most notable example is the use of the
power to detain persons that qualify as material witnesses for ongoing criminal investigations and prosecutions.4 Moreover, the U.S. and other nations
have undertaken numerous measures, both in domestic and international
law, to enhance the criminal law enforcement powers available to combat
terrorism.
In addition to the criminal law enforcement paradigm, the U.S. has
expanded and employed its framework of immigration laws as an alternate
detention mechanism. As in the arena of criminal law enforcement, the
years since 9/11 have witnessed enhanced government powers and in2
Alberto R. Gonzalez, Counsel to the President, Remarks before the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security (Feb. 24, 2004), available at
http://fas.org/irp/news/2004/02/gonzales.pdf.
3
See generally U.S. Department of Justice, Counterterrorism White Paper (June 22,
2006), available at http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/169/include/terrorism.whitepap
er.pdf.
4
The primary provision regarding material witnesses can be found at 18 U.S.C. § 3144
(2006). For example, both Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen, and Ali Saleh Kahlah al Marri, an
alien resident in the U.S., were initially detained in 2001 as material witnesses for the investigation into the 9/11 attacks. See Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 164 (4th Cir. 2007);
Steve Fainaru & Margot Williams, Material Witness Law Has Many in Limbo; Nearly Half
Held in War on Terror Haven’t Testified, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2002, at A1. Both were
ultimately transferred to military custody and further detained as enemy combatants. 487
F.3d at 165; Kirk Semple, Padilla Sentenced to 17 Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
2008. The U.S. government eventually transferred Padilla back to the ordinary civilian criminal justice system, where he was tried and convicted for terrorism-related crimes that were
unrelated to the original basis for his detention. Peter Whoriskey & Dan Eggen, Judge Sentences Padilla to 17 Years, Cites His Detention, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2008, at A3. According to the Washington Post, between September 2001 and November 2002, at least forty-four
persons were detained as material witnesses in connection with terrorism investigations.
Steve Fainaru & Margot Williams, Material Witness Law Has Many in Limbo; Nearly Half
Held in War on Terror Haven’t Testified, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2002, at A1. Of those fortyfour, twenty were never brought before a grand jury. Id.
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creased enforcement operations with respect to foreign nationals.5 Although
immigration laws and processes generally do not apply to citizens, immigration laws do apply to foreign nationals who legally have entered and resided
in the U.S. for extended periods, not just illegal immigrants or those foreign
nationals who are stopped at the border.
A third—and in some quarters more controversial—legal mechanism used to effectuate the prevention imperative is the law of armed conflict
(LOAC). Framing the conflict with al Qaeda and its network of affiliates as
a “global war on terror” and relying on the 2001 Authorization for the Use
of Military Force (AUMF) adopted by Congress,6 the U.S. has cited the
long-established customary and conventional power of nations to detain
enemy combatants as the legal basis for holding many suspected terrorist
operatives in military custody. This power, which permits a nation to hold
enemy combatants for the duration of a conflict to prevent them from returning to the battle, also has been asserted by the U.S. government to detain both U.S. citizens and foreign nationals, and with respect to both persons detained in the U.S. and persons detained in foreign nations.
Despite the availability and use of these multiple legal mechanisms,
a growing number of prominent U.S. legal scholars and practitioners have
suggested that the U.S. should enact a new system of security detention
(also termed “preventive detention” or “administrative detention”). These
scholars and practitioners suggest that the challenges facing the government
under the current multi-prong approach, and the questions of fundamental
fairness to some detainees under that approach, necessitate such a new system. Moreover, these commentators have expressed concern that the current
strategy is accomplished only by distorting these legal paradigms in ways
that will ultimately spill over into government efforts to combat threats other than terrorism.

5

See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11
DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS, 2, 15, 47 (2003),
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf. (stating that approximately 762 aliens were
detained in the U.S. in connection with the 9/11 investigation). By far, most of those aliens
were detained under immigration provisions related to illegal entry or expired visas, and the
overwhelming number of those charges were found to be invalid. The vast majority of the
detained aliens were never connected to terrorism, and prior to 9/11 many of them would not
have been detained for those violations. Id.
6
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No., 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at
50 U.S.C. § 1541).
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The Challenges of the Current Approach

1.

Shortcomings of old and new paradigms to combat terror threats

467

Before 9/11, the United States and many other nations viewed terrorism primarily as an issue of criminal law enforcement. Efforts to combat
terrorism too often focused on post hoc criminal investigations that were
designed to develop criminal cases for prosecution. Generally, post hoc
criminal investigations often involve interdicting terrorist activity close to
the point of attack, or, too frequently, after an attack has occurred, when
evidence of offensive conduct and intent naturally is more unequivocal.
This strategy largely permits shielding sensitive intelligence information—
including evidence from intelligence investigations—from disclosure during
judicial proceedings.
This approach might be understandable in response to a brand of
terrorism that: (1) involves sporadic attacks; (2) limits civilian casualties
(through advance warnings and the like) to insulate political agendas (e.g.
the Marxist and nationalist terror groups of the 1970s); (3) primarily targets
property interests (for example, modern eco-terrorists); (4) is secularly inspired; and (5) is almost exclusively domestic. However, this historical
brand of terrorism has been joined, and to some extent eclipsed, by a fundamentally different terrorist threat, namely one perpetrated by religiously
inspired radical extremist groups such as al Qaeda and its associated organizations around the world. These modern terrorist groups employ a wide web
of support for recruitment, procurement, logistics, and operational planning.
They present a global terrorist threat interested in carrying out repetitive
attacks involving indiscriminate mass casualties and severe damage to economic and social infrastructure (including critical systems such as energy,
communications, and food and water supplies). These groups have a genuine interest in the use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
weapons, and a willingness, if not a desire, to die (through suicide or otherwise) to achieve their mission.
Just as the nature of the modern terrorist threat has evolved, so have
the challenges of investigating and prosecuting that threat. Terrorist investigations are increasingly multi-jurisdictional. Differences in capabilities,
timeframes of action, judicial systems (accusatorial versus inquisitorial,
common law versus civil law, and the like), willingness to cooperate, availability of resources, and enforcement authority create serious investigative
obstacles. These obstacles make it far more difficult for government agencies to obtain relevant, useful evidence while simultaneously increasing the
time and cost of trying to do so. In addition, the global nature of modern
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terrorism means that evidence may often be obtained under extraordinary
circumstances or in extraordinary places.7
The forensic requirements of modern terrorism investigations are
also far more complex and time consuming than in the past, particularly
given the possibility of WMD hazards. The methodology of simultaneous
attacks extends and complicates forensic examination and analysis, especially when the forensic sites are located in major metropolitan areas and
infrastructure systems. Modern forensic investigations also require deployment of specialized teams, the number of which are limited and the functions of which are often sequential in nature, meaning that parallel efforts
are difficult, if not impossible.8
As a result of the changed threat environment and these investigative challenges, suspected terrorist activities must be disrupted earlier in the
planning and preparation cycle. Terrorism investigations now are more of7

Operation Springbourne, an investigation by the British Metropolitan Police of a terrorism plot using ricin, provides a demonstration of obstacles to terrorism investigations. Conducted between 2002 and 2005, Operation Springbourne spanned twenty-seven jurisdictions.
HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, TERRORISM DETENTION POWERS, 2005–06, H.C. 910-I, at 56,
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmhaff/910/910i.
pdf. Because U.K. law required charging decisions within a short timeframe and evidence
was not able to be developed from the many jurisdictions within that timeframe, the authorities were unable to prosecute the suspects for terrorism charges. Id. Instead, the suspects
were prosecuted for ordinary crimes such as fraud or forgery arising from some peripheral
document and credit card fraud schemes. Id. A suspect later determined to be a prime conspirator fled the country while on bail awaiting trial on the lesser charges. Id.
8
For example, the July 2005 London bombings created the largest crime scene in the
United Kingdom’s history—and it took place in the heart of London’s critical transport infrastructure. See Minutes of Evidence Before the British H. of Commons Home Affairs Comm.,
Session 06 (2005) (testimony of British Metropolitan Police Commissioner Ian Blair and
Assistant Commissioner Andy Hayman to the British House of Commons Home Affairs
Committee) [hereinafter Minutes of Evidence], available at http://www.publications.parlia
ment.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmhaff/462/5091305.htm. As of September 2005, law enforcement authorities had collected over 38,000 evidentiary exhibits. See id. The evidence to
be preserved, collected, and analyzed included thousands of hours of closed circuit television
(CCTV) videos and over 1,400 fingerprints. See id. As the investigations expanded, over
160 sites became potential crime scenes. See id. According to the British Metropolitan Police, one such site involved a so-called “bomb factory” discovered in the Yorkshire area. See
HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, supra note 7, at 19. Investigators required over two weeks to
secure safe access to the site, and examination required another six weeks. See id. Definitive
forensic analysis of the explosive devices could not be completed before charging decisions
were required under U.K. law, and thus a much more limited assessment of the device had to
be used to interrogate the suspects prior to charge. See id. at 56–57. New technology also
increases the time required for terrorism investigations. These investigations often involve
seizure of large numbers (i.e., into the hundreds) of computer hard drives that store vast
amounts of data. See id.at 18–19. That data must be secured, often decrypted, examined, and
ultimately assessed prior to being incorporated into investigative interviews or other steps.
Id. Many of these steps cannot be done simultaneously, and thus the time involved is necessarily increased. See id.
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ten viewed as intelligence cases, and prosecution of terrorist crimes is only
one tool available to neutralize terrorist threats. However, the realities of
intelligence pose serious problems. The key limit on intelligence is its incompleteness; rarely does intelligence tell the whole story, and terrorists
take proactive steps to secure and obscure information. Intelligence is sporadic, fragmentary, often inferential at best, and difficult to interpret. It requires validation, prioritization, sifting, assessment and judgment. Intelligence is also fragile. It comes from human sources who risk their lives to
obtain it, and from sensitive technologies that can be countered by skilled
and informed opponents. Highly dependable intelligence information may
have been provided by a foreign government on the condition that the information, or the government’s cooperation, is not publicly disclosed.9
Statutes such as the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA)10
provide limited relief for these concerns. To be sure, CIPA provides a valuable procedural mechanism for making determinations about the disclosure
of national security information in criminal proceedings and to help “prevent[] unnecessary or inadvertent disclosures of classified information.”11
CIPA accomplishes this goal through: pre-trial conferences; notice requirements; judicial protective orders; ex parte and in camera submissions; court
authorized deletions, summaries and stipulations; pre-trial evidentiary hearings; and interlocutory appeals. But CIPA “neither adds to nor detracts from
the substantive rights of the defendant or the discoery [sic] obligations of
the government.”12 Instead, it merely permits the government “to know in
advance of a potential threat from a criminal prosecution to its national security . . . and advis[es] the government of the national security ‘cost’ of
going forward.”13 Indeed, where a court rejects protective measures pro9

See Dame Eliza Mannignham-Buller, Dir. Gen., British Security Services, Address at
the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) (Sept. 1, 2005), available at
http://www.mi5.gov.uk/print/Page387.html [hereinafter Mannigham Speech].
10
18 U.S.C. App. 3 §§ 1–16 (1980).
11
U.S ATTY. CRIM. RESOURCE MANUAL, SYNOPSIS OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
PROCEDURES ACT, HTTP://WWW.USDOJ.GOV/USAO/EOUSA/FOIA_READING_ROOM/USAM/TITLE
9/CRM02054.HTM [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEY MANUAL].
12
Id.
13
Id. The ABA has concluded that CIPA
provides procedures for notice to the government and judicial screening when the
defendant wishes to reveal classified information. It is designed to limit the defense’s ability to leverage its possession of classified information in plea negotiations. CIPA provides no protection for information that the prosecution might need
to introduce or for information that the defense is permitted to introduce.
ABA TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM AND THE LAW, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON
MILITARY COMMISSIONS, Jan. 4, 2002, at 14, n.33. Thus, although “mechanisms exist to
protect evidence of a classified nature from public exposure, these may not suffice to protect
the information from the defendants and, through them, others who may use such information to the harm of the U.S. and its citizens.” Id. at 14.
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posed under CIPA, the government “ha[s] two options: (1) order the case to
be dismissed; or (2) file an affidavit effectively prohibiting the use of the
contested classified information. At that point, the court may impose sanctions against the government, which may include striking all or part of a
witness’s testimony, resolving an issue of fact against the United States, or
dismissing part or all of the indictment.”14
Perhaps the most important aspect of this new paradigm is the critical dilemma it poses to both governments and societies alike. Specifically,
how does a government protect its citizens within the rule of law when intelligence that is considered reliable does not meet the high evidentiary thresholds developed by society in the context of ordinary criminal prosecutions, and still protect the sources and methods essential to acquiring that
critical information? For example, authorities could correctly believe that a
terrorist attack is being planned, but the authorities must release any individuals arrested in connection with the suspected threat because the plan is
too embryonic and vague to obtain criminal charges and convictions, or
because the intelligence underlying the authorities’ belief is too sensitive to
reveal the sources, methods, or technological capabilities that gave rise to
the information.15 Accordingly, it may be in the best interest of society to
14

Jim McAdams, The Classified Information Procedures Act: An Introduction and Practical Guide for Criminal Investigators (Nov. 13, 2007), http://www.fletc.gov/training/prog
rams/legal-division/downloads-articles-and-faqs/articles/the-classified-information-proced
ures-act.html; see also, U.S. ATTORNEY MANUAL, supra note 11 (citing a specific example of
where this issue might arise: the testimony of covert intelligence operatives). According to §
2054 of the U.S. Attorney’s Criminal Resource Manual, the success of the intelligence community
turns in significant part upon the ability of its intelligence officers covertly to obtain information from human sources. In carrying out that task, the intelligence officers must, when necessary, be able to operate anonymously, that is, without their
connection to an intelligence agency of the United States being known to the persons with whom they come in contact. For that reason, an intelligence agency is
authorized under Executive Order 12958 to classify the true name of an intelligence officer. During the pre-trial progression of an indicted case, as the court enters its CIPA rulings …, it may become apparent to the prosecutor that testimony
may be required from an intelligence officer or other agency representative engaged in covert activity, either because the Court has ruled under CIPA that certain
evidence is relevant and admissible in the defense case, or because such testimony
is necessary in the government's rebuttal. Just as the substance of that testimony, to
the extent it is classified and is being offered by the defense, must be the subject of
CIPA determinations by the court, the prosecutor must also ensure that the same
considerations are afforded to the true names of covert intelligence community
personnel, if those true names are classified information.
Id.
15
See Manningham Speech, supra note 9. But see Minutes of Evidence, supra note 8 (testimony of British Home Secretary Charles Clarke), available at http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmhaff/462/5091302.htm (observing that, in the weeks
before the bombings, the U.K.’s Joint Terrorism Analysis Center concluded that there was no
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intervene in the absence of substantial admissible evidence in order to prevent or disrupt a terrorist plot, even if the effect is to compromise a related
criminal investigation and jeopardize follow-up prosecutions.
Although the U.S. has prosecuted a number of terrorism cases in the
ordinary criminal courts, many of the “successful” cases have involved
highly unusual circumstances.16 Others cases only have succeeded in obtaining convictions of significantly lesser charges,17 failed altogether,18 or involved novel (some would say troubling) applications of the law. Moreover,
despite U.S. efforts to prosecute some terrorist suspects before military
commissions as unlawful combatants under the law of armed conflict, as of
single terrorist group “with both the current intent and the capability to attack the UK,” and
the threat level under which the authorities operated was reduced accordingly). Home Secretary Charles Clarke testified,“[I]ntelligence is not knowledge.” Id. Rather, intelligence is an
effort to understand threats to a nation using a variety of techniques and sources, and then
assessing the information gathered to come to a view. See id.
16
For example, Richard Reid, the so-called “shoe bomber,” was prosecuted for attempting
to detonate an explosive device on a trans-Atlantic commercial flight in December 2001. See
Indictment, United States v. Reid, 206 F.Supp.2d 132 (D. Mass 2002). The explosives were
hidden in the soles of his shoes. Id. Had he succeeded in lighting one of the several matches
he struck, Reid would have killed more than 180 innocent passengers and crew members. Id.
Reid ultimately pled guilty to virtually all charges, likening himself a soldier at war against
the U.S., and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Richard Reid’s Response To Government’s Motion To Vacate Or Modify Appointment Of Counsel For Defendant, United States
v. Reid, 206 F.Supp.2d 132 (D. Mass 2002). Similarly, Zacarias Moussaoui also pled guilty
to terrorism offenses related to the 9/11 plot. See Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, United
States v. Moussaoui, 282 F.Supp.2d 480 (E.D. Va. 2003). Like Reid, Moussaoui used his
trial to cast himself as a warrior against the U.S., and was ultimately sentenced to life imprisonment. Id.
17
See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Justice Dept. Statistics on Terrorism Faulted, WASH. POST, Feb.
21, 2007, at A08 (explaining that Department of Justice Inspector General report shows that
many terrorism-related cases result in charges on minor crimes or immigration violations
unrelated to terrorism); Dan Eggen & Julie Tate, U.S. Campaign Produces Few Convictions
on Terrorism Charges, WASH. POST, June 12, 2005, at A01 (reporting that out of 200 terrorism-suspect convictions reviewed, only 39 convictions were for terrorism or other national
security charges; most were for more ordinary crimes such as making false statements or
immigration violations). For an overview of U.S. terrorism-related prosecutions between
2001 and 2006, see generally U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 3.
18
See, e.g., Adam Liptak & Leslie Eaton, Financing Mistrial Adds to U.S. Missteps in
Terror Prosecution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2007, at A16 (noting a larger percentage of terrorism prosecutions brought since 9/11 have been lost compared to pre-9/11 terrorism prosecutions, in part because pre-9/11 terrorism convictions “were for completed acts of violence . . .
or for conspiracies that were relatively close to fruition,” whereas post-9/11 prosecutions
tend to be for less definitive activities, “reflective of a conscious change in Washington’s law
enforcement strategy, to prevention from punishment”); Leslie Eaton, U.S. Prosecution of
Muslim Group Ends in Mistrial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2007, at A1 (detailing lack of a single
conviction in the trial of the Holy Land Foundation, one of the largest terrorist financing
prosecutions in U.S. history); Eric Lichtblau, Setback for U.S. in Terror Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 7, 2005, at A1 (detailing failure of seventeen counts against former professor Sami alArian for providing support and resources for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad).
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November 2008, only two such commissions have been completed. A series
of challenges (many of them successful) to the legal basis and structure of
the commissions are largely responsible for the failure of these efforts.19
2.

Scholarly criticism of the current approach

Concern for the difficulties facing investigators and prosecutors has
led a growing number of commentators to conclude that the U.S. should
consider adopting a new system of preventive detention, or perhaps some
form of modified criminal process, for terrorism and other national security
cases. Additionally, some commentators have suggested that the current
seemingly ad hoc approach to detention of terrorism suspects poses more
risk to civil liberty than the adoption of a formal system of preventive detention would pose.
For example, Professors Jack Goldsmith (former head of the Office
of Legal Counsel at the U.S. Department of Justice) and Eric Posner have
argued that the U.S. should abandon trials of terrorist suspects before military commissions in favor of preventive military detention subject to more
rigorous standards and enhanced oversight.20 Professor Goldsmith later concluded, together with Professor Neal Katyal (counsel for the detainees in the
case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 21), that Congress should explicitly establish
and sanction “a comprehensive system of preventive detention . . . that
would . . . supplement the criminal process . . . [and] . . . would have greater
legitimacy than our current patchwork system.”22
Similarly, prior to his current post as U.S. Attorney General, Michael Mukasey (a former Federal district court judge who handled several of
the most prominent U.S. terrorism cases) wrote that Congress should deliberate “how to fix a strained and mismatched legal system, before another
cataclysm calls forth from the people demands for hastier and harsher results.”23 Mukasey urged Congress to consider proposals to create national
security courts or to develop measures akin to civil commitment to “incapa-

19

See, e.g., William Glaberson, U.S. Seeks Execution for 6 in Sept. 11 Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 2008, at A1 (discussing military tribunal’s failure to begin any trials as of early
2008).The only military commissions completed as of November 2008 were the guilty plea
of the Australian David Hicks and the conviction of Salim Hamdan (a.k.a. “bin Laden’s
driver”) for providing material support.
20
See Jack Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Editorial, A Better Way on Detainees, WASH.
POST, Aug. 4, 2006, at A17.
21
548 U.S. 557 (2006).
22
Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, Op-Ed, The Terrorists’ Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
2007, at A19.
23
Michael B. Mukasey, Op-Ed, Jose Padilla Makes Bad Law, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2007,
at A15.
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citate dangerous people” suspected of involvement in terrorism.24 He
reached this conclusion not simply as a result of the prosecutorial, financial
and intelligence challenges faced by the government, but also because “if
conventional legal rules are adapted to deal with a terrorist threat, whether
by relaxed standards for conviction, searches, the admissibility of evidence
or otherwise, those adaptations will infect and change the standards in ordinary cases with ordinary defendants in ordinary courts of law.”25
Most recently, Professor John Farmer, a former Attorney General of
the State of New Jersey and former senior counsel to the 9/11 Commission,
reviewed the terrorism-related prosecutions of Jose Padilla and others since
9/11 for crimes such as material support and conspiracy, and determined
that “[t]hey cry out for the creation of a form of preventive detention
adapted to terrorism, and outside the criminal justice system.”26 Professor
Farmer concluded that “the continued reliance on our criminal justice system as the main domestic weapon in the struggle against terrorism fails on
two counts: it threatens not only to leave our nation unprotected but also to
corrupt the foundations of the criminal law itself.”27 According to Farmer,
“[i]n order to make the criminal justice system an effective weapon [against
terrorism], we have already started extending the reach of criminal statutes
to conduct that has never before been punishable as a crime,”28 and
[t]he urgency involved in terrorism cases has also led courts to accept conduct by the government that might well have been disapproved in other
contexts . . . .
....
. . . When terrorism cases are treated as ordinary criminal prosecutions, the
principles of law that they come to embody will guide law-enforcement
conduct and be cited by the government not just in terrorism cases but in
other criminal contexts.
Over time, we may well transform the law of conspiracy to the point
where an agreement alone is a crime. This would render thoughts punishable, reward government overreaching and erode our civil liberties. All because the criminal law is being used not primarily to punish crimes but for
purposes of detaining people we are worried about.29

24
25
26

Id.
Id.
John Farmer, Op-Ed., A Terror Threat in the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2008, ¶ 4, at

14.
27
28
29

Id.
Id.
Id.
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Judicial responses to the current approach

Apprehension about stretching the bounds of established legal doctrines to fit difficult terrorism matters has surfaced in a number of recent
cases both in the U.S. and abroad. The increasingly broad scope of the material support and conspiracy doctrines used in cases such as Padilla, which
gave rise to Mr. Mukasey’s and Mr. Farmer’s commentaries, is just one
example. Indeed, the federal court that handled the criminal prosecution of
Jose Padilla ultimately imposed a significantly shorter term of imprisonment
than that requested by U.S. prosecutors, at least in part because, in the
court’s view, the evidence did not link Padilla to any specific act of terrorism.30
A related concern centers on the growing tendency to criminalize
conduct that is ever more remote from the actual commission of a terrorist
attack or conduct that is not supported by sufficient proof of terrorist intent.
Earlier this year a court of appeal in the United Kingdom reversed the convictions of five young Muslim students prosecuted for “possess[ing] an article in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that [it was
possessed] for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or
instigation of an act of terrorism,”31 contrary to Article 57 of the U.K.’s
Terrorism Act 2000.32 The articles included documents, compact discs and
computer hard drives that contained extremist religious and political propaganda (described by the prosecution as al Qaeda recruiting material) and
communications that allegedly revealed a plan by the men to travel to Pakistan and receive terrorist training.33 Among the articles was a martyrdom
song, a letter from one of the men saying he had left to take part in warfare,
a military manual, and communications with a contact in Pakistan about
how to travel without raising suspicion.34 The British court ruled that, despite the potentially broad scope of the statutory language:
It was necessary for the prosecution to prove first the purpose for which
each appellant held the [articles at issue] . . . and then to prove that this
purpose was “connected with the commission, preparation or instigation”
of the prospective acts of terrorism relied on by the prosecution . . . .
....

30

See Kirk Semple, Padilla Gets 17-Year Term For Role in Conspiracy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
23, 2008, at A14. (“In explaining her decision, [the judge] . . . questioned the effects of the
conspiracy, saying that there was no evidence linking Mr. Padilla and two co-defendants to
specific terrorism acts anywhere.”).
31
E.g., Zafar v. Regina [2008] EWCA (Crim) 184, [15] (Eng.).
32
Id. at [49].
33
Id. at [1], [40], [44].
34
Id. at [1], [8].
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We have concluded that, if section 57 is to have the certainty of meaning
that the law requires, it must be interpreted in a way that requires a direct
connection between the object possessed and the act of terrorism. . . .
....
. . . [T]he prosecution’s case [suggested] that a much looser connection between the material possessed by the appellants and the terrorist act …
would suffice to establish the appellants’ guilt.35

Another example of judicial pushback occurred in the June 2007
case of al-Marri v. Wright.36 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit examined whether military detention of terrorist suspects
designated as enemy combatants could be extended to a foreign national
who legally entered and resided in the U.S. prior to his detention37—a doctrine that the Supreme Court affirmed in the case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld in
2004.38 Al-Marri was originally arrested and charged with several crimes in
the civilian criminal justice system,39 but before his case went to trial, alMarri was transferred to military custody pursuant to a Presidential Order
determining that, among other things, al-Marri was an enemy combatant in
possession of intelligence that would aid U.S. efforts to prevent attacks by
al Qaeda.40
35
Id. at [24], [29], [34]; See also Five Students Win Terror Appeal, BBC NEWS, Feb. 13,
2008 (discussing Appellate Court decision).
36
Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007).
37
See id. at 164.
38
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 517, 519 (2004).
39
See Al-Marri, 487 F.3d at 164. Al-Marri, a citizen of Qatar, entered the U.S. on September 10, 2001, and resided legally in the State of Illinois. Id. He was originally arrested by
civilian authorities in the U.S. as a material witness to the 9/11 investigation and eventually
indicted for several domestic crimes. Id. None of the charges against al-Marri were terrorism-specific crimes; instead, he was charged with more general crimes that often arise in
terrorism investigations, such as “possession of unauthorized or counterfeit credit card numbers with intent to defraud . . . making false statements to the FBI [and] . . . on a banking
application, and . . . using another person’s identification for the purpose of influencing the
action of a federally insured financial institution.” Id. “Al-Marri pleaded not guilty to these
charges.” Id.
40
See id. at 164–66 (“The declaration of Jeffery N. Rapp, Director of the Joint Intelligence
Task Force for Combatting Terrorism . . . asserts that al-Marri: (1) is ‘closely associated with
al Qaeda, an international terrorist organization with which the United States is at war’’; (2)
trained at an al Qaeda terrorist training camp . . . ; (3) in the summer of 2001, was introduced
to Osama Bin Laden by Khalid Shaykh Muhammed; (4) . . . volunteered for a ‘‘martyr mission’’on behalf of al Qaeda; (5) . . . enter[ed] the United States sometime before September
11, 2001, to serve as a ‘‘sleeper agent’’ to facilitate terrorist activities and explore disrupting
this country’s financial system through computer hacking; (6) . . . met with [and received
funds from] terrorist financier; (7) gathered technical information about poisonous chemicals
. . . (8) undertook efforts to obtain false [and stolen] identification, credit cards, and banking
information . . . ; (9) communicated with known terrorists including, Khalid Shaykh Mu-
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The court’s answer was an emphatic “No.” According to the court,
even assuming all of the allegations about al-Marri’s conduct were true, the
government had no authority to treat al-Marri as an enemy combatant or as
anything other than a civilian.41
If the government accurately describe[d] al-Marri’s conduct, . . . [he
could] be returned to civilian prosecutors, tried on criminal charges, and, if
convicted, punished severely. But the government cannot subject al-Marri
to indefinite military detention. For in the United States, the military cannot seize and imprison civilians—let alone imprison them indefinitely.42

Given the level of concern of courts, legal scholars and practitioners
alike, perhaps it is time to re-examine the issue of preventive detention in
the U.S. in the context of terrorism.
B.

The Legal Landscape of Preventive Detention in the United States

Preventive detention refers to the detention or confinement of a person believed to pose a threat to national security or to public safety and order, or a person whose presence at a public proceeding is required but cannot be guaranteed.43 The purpose of the detention is avoidance of the potential danger or absence rather than the punishment of a criminal offense. Although many, if not most, people held under some form of preventive detention are in fact criminal defendants, others may not have been accused of
crimes.44
Some might suggest that preventive detention necessarily infringes
fundamental principles of both U.S. Constitutional law and international

hammed and Al-Hawsawi, by phone and e-mail; and (10) saved [jihadist] information . . . on
his laptop computer . . . Rapp [did not allege] that al-Marri [was] a citizen, or affiliate of the
armed forces, of any nation at war with the United States . . . [or] directly participated in any
hostilities against United States or allied armed forces.”).
41
See id at 164. The Fourth Circuit later vacated the panel decision and reviewed alMarri’s case en banc. The en banc court held: (1) assuming the government’s allegations
about al-Marri’s conduct were true, Congress had authorized his detention as an enemy combatant; but (2) al-Marri had not been afforded sufficient process to challenge his designation
as an enemy combatant. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)
(reversing the district court and remanding for further proceedings). The U.S. Supreme Court
has recently agreed to review the al-Marri case during the 2008 term. See Robert Barnes,
Supreme Court to Hear Case of Accused Al-Qaeda Member, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2008, at
A2.
42
Id.
43
See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (discussing rationale behind
preventive detention).
44
See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 517, 518–19 (2004).
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law.45 Others might contend that preventive detention is a widely accepted
practice that is thoroughly consonant with the concept of ordered liberty.46
The truth lies somewhere in the middle. Multiple sources of legal authority
govern the standards and conditions of detention, including domestic law,
international human rights law, and, in certain circumstances, the law of
armed conflict (also called international humanitarian law).47 Preventive
detention by its very nature therefore has one foot in the international legal
world and one in the world of domestic law.
The basic instruments of international human rights law neither explicitly permit nor prohibit preventive detention, although they do establish
certain basic substantive and procedural standards relevant to the issue.
Most important is the freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention, and the
requirement that arrest, detention and other deprivations of liberty must be
for lawful grounds and according to established legal procedures.48 Further,
anyone arrested or detained has a right to: (1) information about the grounds
underlying the deprivation; (2) independent proceedings to determine the
lawfulness of the detention; and (3) freedom from torture or any other form
of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.49 The law of
armed conflict provides for many similar detainee rights.50
45

See, e.g., Al-Marri, 487 F.3d at 163–64 (stating the court’s view that al-Marri’s detention violated constitutional principles).
46
See id. (discussing the Government’s perspective that it had the authority to detain alMarri).
47
See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 216 (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 972 U.N.T.S.
1950, 4 Bevans 852 [hereinafter POW Convention].
48
See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 47.
49
See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, arts. 5, 8, 9, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess. 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 21, 1948); ICCPR, supra note 47, at arts. 7,
9(1), 9(2), 9(4); Body of Principles for the Protection of all Persons under any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, principles 2, 4, 6, 11, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/173
(Dec. 9, 1988); United Nations Convention Against Torture, G.A. Res. 39/46, arts. 2(1),
16(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter CAT]. Note that, except for the
prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, each of the freedoms and
rights mentioned may be subject to derogation if necessary during times of officially proclaimed public emergency. See ICCPR, supra note 47, at art. 4.
50
The Geneva Conventions permit internment of prisoners of war in international armed
conflicts until the cessation of hostilities. See POW Convention, supra note 47, arts. 4, 21,
118. The Geneva Conventions also provide for review by a “competent tribunal” of the basis
for prisoner of war status “[s]hould any doubt arise.” Id. at art. 5. The Geneva Conventions
permit the internment of certain civilians when necessary for security, and provide for reconsideration or appeal of such decisions (and further periodic review) by an appropriate judicial
or administrative body. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, arts. 42, 43, 78, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [herei-
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More importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court has clearly stated that
“[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or
other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the
Due Process] Clause protects.”51 As a result,
government detention violates [the Due Process] Clause unless the detention is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural protections, or in certain special and narrow non-punitive circumstances where a
special justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness, outweighs

nafter Civilian Persons Convention]. The law of armed conflict also prohibits torture and
other inhumane treatment of combatants and civilians both in international and noninternational armed conflict. See POW Convention, supra note 47, arts. 3(1), 13, 17; Civilian
Persons Convention, supra, arts. 27, 31, 32, 37. Further, whereas the provisions of both
international human rights treaties and law of armed conflict treaties may be limited in their
application based on the terms of the treaty (for example, many provisions of human rights
treaties do not strictly apply to State activities outside the territory of the State at issue),
customary international law outlines certain fundamental human rights guarantees that bind
all states, in all circumstances. See, e.g., Press Release, United Nations Information Service,
Prohibition of Torture “Absolute” U.N. Doc. SG/SM/9373, OBV/428 (June 18, 2004) available at http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2004/sgsm9373.html. These rights generally are understood to include freedom from “prolonged arbitrary detention” and “torture or
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.” THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL,
UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 6-1, 6-2 (2000); THE JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE OPERATIONS &
LAW 127–28 (2002). As a statutory matter, U.S. law explicitly forbids any cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment (including torture) of detainees in U.S. custody regardless of their geographical location, and prohibits the U.S. Department of Defense from interrogating detainees in any manner not authorized by the U.S. Army Field Manual on Military Interrogations. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, Tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739
(2005). In September 2006, the U.S. Army replaced the Field Manual on Military Interrogations with a new Field Manual on Human Intelligence Collection Operations, which prohibits
torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. U.S. DEPT. OF THE ARMY, HUMAN
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR OPERATIONS, FM 2-22.3 viii (2006). It also contains a list of interrogation techniques that are specifically forbidden, including sexually humiliating acts, hooding, infliction of physical pain, “water-boarding,” and the use of military working dogs to
instill fear. Id. at 5–21. Nevertheless, the issue of detainee treatment persists, in part because
the U.S. government asserts the right of agencies other than the Department of Defense (e.g.,
the Central Intelligence Agency) to use unspecified enhanced interrogation techniques
beyond those in the Field Manual, provided they do not constitute torture or mistreatment as
defined by the U.S. government. See, e.g., Pamela Hess, House Fails to Override Torture
Veto, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 11, 2008; Dan Eggen, Bush Announces Veto of Waterboarding Ban, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2008, at A02; George W. Bush, President of the U.S.,
Text of the President’s Weekly Radio Address (Mar. 8, 2008), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/03/20080308.html.
51
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71,
80 (1992)).
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the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.52

A statutory bias against emergency detention of citizens also has
existed in the U.S. since 1971 when Congress enacted the Non-Detention
Act as part of legislation that repealed the earlier Emergency Detention
Act.53 The Non-Detention Act plainly states that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an
Act of Congress.”54
As the Supreme Court indicated, the U.S. has recognized several
exceptions to the general rule against detention of individuals absent the
ordinary protections afforded a criminal defendant. The fundamental nature
of the liberty interest involved compels that such exceptions be fairly limited. As such, preventive detention in the U.S. is a more recent, circumscribed power (both substantively and procedurally)55 than many would
prefer to accept, particularly in cases that do not involve post-charge, pretrial detention of a criminal defendant.
1.

Pre-trial detention

For most of the 20th Century, preventive detention was largely limited to criminal defendants awaiting trial for murder, criminal defendants
who posed a flight risk, insane persons and other dangerous incompetents,
and those with infectious diseases.56 Other serious criminal defendants considered dangerous to the community may have been placed under de facto
preventive detention through the imposition of high bail amounts, but the
general practice in criminal proceedings was to set bail and provide conditional release pending trial. In the 1970s, state and local governments increasingly instituted preventive detention for criminal defendants accused of
52
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690–92 (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (original emphasis omitted). This fundamental right to due process finds its origin in
both the Fifth Amendment guarantee against deprivations of liberty without due process of
law and the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable seizures. U.S. CONST.
amends. V, IV.
53
LOUIS FISHER, DETENTION OF U.S. CITIZENS, 1 (2005). The Emergency Detention Act,
which provided procedures for emergency executive detention of individuals deemed likely
to engage in espionage or sabotage, was adopted in 1950 during another period of intense
national security concerns. Id.
54
18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (1948).
55
“[T]he Due Process Clause contains a substantive component that bars certain arbitrary,
wrongful government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement
them.” Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80 (internal quotation omitted).
56
One example of preventive detention that does not fit this mold is the Japanese internment cases from World War II. Although these cases have been largely discredited, they
have not been formally overruled.
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dangerous or violent crimes, and in 1984 Congress passed the Federal Bail
Reform Act,57 which authorized pre-trial preventive detention for defendants accused of a much broader range of violent crimes and other demonstrably dangerous defendants.
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the preventive detention provisions
of the Act in United States v. Salerno,58 in which the defendants were
charged with numerous violent racketeering and organized crime offenses.
Reversing the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court found
that the Bail Reform Act satisfied both substantive and procedural due
process concerns.59 Pre-trial detention imposed under the Act was regulatory (administrative) in nature rather than punitive; it served not to punish the
defendant but to prevent danger to the community—a legitimate and compelling regulatory goal.60 Though seemingly indefinite, detention under the
act was limited to a pre-trial period, which was not excessive relative to the
purpose of the detention.61 The Act also provided for a prompt judicial hearing—at which the detainee had the right to request counsel, testify, present
evidence, confront witnesses, and from which he could appeal—to determine the propriety of detention.62 Moreover, the Act, which required holding a defendant apart from the ordinary prison population to the extent possible, reserved detention for “individuals who have been arrested for a specific category of extremely serious offenses” and whose danger had been
proved by clear and convincing evidence.63
In the wake of Salerno, the U.S. now regularly permits pre-trial
preventive detention of a wide range of dangerous criminal defendants, and

57

Federal Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3150 (1984).
See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
59
See id. at 752–55.
60
Id. at 747.
61
See id. at 747. The Speedy Trial Act limits the length of the pre-trial detention. Id.
62
Id. at 739.
63
Id. at 747–752. Of course, in the U.S. pre-trial detention differs in one critical way from
the other bases for preventive detention discussed in this article, as all pre-trial defendants
have at least been charged with a criminal offense on the finding of probable cause to believe
that the defendant committed the crime. 18 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2006). The U.S. is not the only
system to permit extended pre-trial detention of dangerous criminal defendants; for example,
in the terrorism context both France and Spain permit pre-trial detention of up to four years.
See HOME OFFICE, TERRORIST INVESTIGATIONS AND THE FRENCH EXAMINING MAGISTRATES
SYSTEM 7 (2007) (“In France, the period of pre-trial detention can last up to 4 years.”);
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURES IN SPAIN: PROLONGED PRE-TRIAL
DETENTION (2005), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/spain0105/9.htm (explaining that persons accused of serious crimes “may be held in pre-trial detention for up to 4
years”).
58
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pre-trial preventive detention is routinely available for federal criminal defendants charged with terrorism-related offenses.64
2.

The mentally ill and recidivist sex offenders

Due Process also permits preventive detention for certain classes of
persons in the U.S. other than pre-trial criminal defendants, notably those
who are mentally impaired and, more recently and more controversially,
recidivist sex offenders.65 A review of the seminal case law surrounding
64

The Bail Reform Act now includes a rebuttable presumption in favor of pre-trial detention of any person accused of a “federal crime of terrorism” (as defined in 18 U.S.C.
§2332b(g)(5)(B)) for which a prison term of ten years or more is applicable. See 18 U.S.C. §
3142(e) (2006). The Supreme Court has also upheld pre-trial preventive detention of juvenile
criminal suspects considered to present a danger to the community. See Schall v. Martin,
467 U.S. 253 (1984). An issue related to, but distinct from, pre-trial detention is pre-charge
detention. In the past several years, the United Kingdom has extended the pre-charge period
during which terrorist suspects may be detained in connection with criminal investigations.
Recent legislation in the United Kingdom allows terrorist suspects to be detained for up to
twenty-eight days before charges must be filed or the detainee released. See Terrorism Act,
2006, c. 11 (Eng.), § 23.
65
The U.S. is not the only country to have enacted legislation permitting the civil detention of the mentally ill, sexual offenders and other criminals who continue to pose a danger
after their criminal sentences are completed. For example, in 2003 the parliament of Queensland, Australia enacted the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003, which authorizes a court to order post-sentence imprisonment of serious sexual offenders where the court
has found reasonable grounds to believe the prisoner will commit a serious sexual offense if
released. See Patrick Keyser & Sam Blay, Double Punishment? Preventive Detention
Schemes Under Australian Legislation and Their Consistency with International Law: The
Fardon Communication, 7 MELBOURNE J. OF INT’L L. (2006). In early 2008 France adopted a
new law permitting the continued detention of certain dangerous criminals even after they
served their full sentence. See French Pass Bill on Lifelong Internment for Deranged Covicts, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Jan. 10, 2008, available at http://www.monstersandcritic
s.com/news/europe/news/article_1385786.php/French_pass_bill_on_lifelong_internment_for
_deranged_convicts. Inspired by a 2007 kidnapping and rape of a 5-year-old boy by a 61year-old sexual predator, the law originated as a measure to be applied only to persons convicted of serious crimes against children. Id. However, the final law passed applied to anyone
convicted of a broader range of serious crimes and subject to imprisonment for 15 years or
more. Id. The law establishes a multi-disciplinary commission including medical and legal
professionals to make the detention determination. Id. Detention is renewable each year
without limit. Id.; see also Press Release, Amnesty International, France: Amnesty International’s Concerns on ‘Preventive Detention’ Bill (Feb. 8, 2008), http://www.amnestyusa.org
/document.php?lang=e&id=ENGEUR210022008 (discussing human rights concerns related
to France’s preventive detention bill). Similarly, in 2004 Germany enacted legislation permitting post-sentence detention of those convicted of a crime against life, bodily integrity,
personal freedom, or sexual self-determination when facts “indicate a considerable danger
from the prisoner for the general public.” Andrew A. Hammel, Preventive Detention in
Comparative Perspective, in ANNUAL OF GERMAN & EUROPEAN LAW VOLUME II & III, at 89–
115 (R. Miller & P. Zumbanse, eds., Berghahn Books 2006) (discussing and quoting §66b of
the German Penal Code), available at http://works.bepress.com/andrew_hammel/1. Such
detention can be ordered by a court “if a complete evaluation of the prisoner, his crimes, and

482

CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 40:463

these doctrines, however, indicates that the circumstances justifying preventive detention are quite limited.
In Addington v. Texas the Supreme Court upheld the preventive detention of a mentally incapacitated person upon a showing by clear and
convincing evidence that the person posed a danger to himself or to others,
and where the person was entitled to a periodic release hearing.66 Detention
could continue provided the person remained mentally ill and continued to
pose a danger to society.67
Foucha v. Louisiana68 highlighted the limits of the Addington doctrine by holding that due process prohibits the continued detention of a person who ceases to suffer from mental illness, even if he continues to pose a
danger to the community. According to the Court, the continued detention
of Foucha bore no “reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual was committed,”69 namely mental disease or illness, regardless of his
dangerousness. Moreover, the statute at issue failed to provide substantive
and procedural safeguards of the kind identified in Salerno.70
Another area where the Supreme Court has permitted preventive detention involves violent sex offenders, particularly those convicted of
crimes involving children. Starting mainly in the 1990s, many U.S. states
adopted new civil commitment laws for sexual predators who continued to
pose a danger after completing their criminal sentences. In Kansas v. Hendricks, the Court considered one such statute and found it satisfied the Constitution’s due process requirement, both substantively and procedurally.71
The statute required a “special justification” beyond mere dangerousness
and so applied only to “a small segment of potentially dangerous individuals,” and it also provided “strict procedural safeguards.”72 Although the statute did not require the finding of a mental illness to justify civil commitment, the Court held that the statute required some form of mental abnormality or anti-social personality disorder, thus limiting detention to individuals with “volitional impairment[s] rendering them dangerous beyond their
control.”73 Further, it provided stringent procedural safeguards including:
. . . his development during prison confinement reveal, that with a high probability he will
commit serious crimes, through which the victims will be seriously psychologically or bodily
injured.” Id. at 97.
66
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
67
Id. at 426.
68
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
69
Id. at 78.
70
See id. at 71–72. The Supreme Court has also permitted detention of dangerous defendants who become mentally incompetent before trial. See Id.
71
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997).
72
Id. at 368.
73
Id. at 358–59.
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(1) an initial finding of probable cause to believe that person is a dangerous
sexual predator; (2) an independent professional evaluation of the individual; and (3) a full trial on the merits of the question.74 The individual possessed the right to counsel (funded if necessary) and the right to a jury.75
3.

Aliens

One area where preventive detention has received more deference
from the courts is under immigration laws. Despite the lack of an explicit
Constitutional power to control immigration, the U.S. Supreme Court has
found that the power to exclude or deport aliens is inherent in the concept of
a sovereign nation.76 The Court has also consistently held that potentially
dangerous aliens may be detained pending removal proceedings,77 much as
dangerous criminals may be held pending trial pursuant to Salerno.
The Court has not reached these conclusions because aliens are
wholly without Constitutional rights. Although the Constitution ordinarily
does not protect aliens in foreign territory,78 it does provide some rights to
aliens who have entered and developed substantial connections with U.S.

74

Id. at 352–53. The statute required proof beyond a reasonable doubt at the trial. Id.
Id. at 352–59; Kansas Inpatient SVP Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 59–29a01. In a subsequent
case, the Court had occasion to clarify the special factor that permitted detention of sexual
predators. According to the Court, the Constitution does not “permit[] commitment of the
type of dangerous sexual offender considered in Hendricks without any lack-of-control determination. Hendricks underscored the constitutional importance of distinguishing a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment ‘from other dangerous persons who are
perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings’ . . . The presence of what the ‘psychiatric profession itself classifies[] . . . as a serious mental disorder’
helped to make that distinction in Hendricks. And a critical distinguishing feature of [the
serious mental disorder in Hendricks] consisted of a special and serious lack of ability to
control behavior. . . . [W]e recognize that in cases where lack of control is at issue, ‘inability
to control behavior’ will not be demonstrable with mathematical precision. It is enough to
say that there must be proof of serious difficult in controlling behavior. And this . . . must be
sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose mental illness, abnormality, or
disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.” Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412-13 (2002) (internal
citations omitted).
76
See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 603–
06 (1889) (“[The power of the government to] exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that
extent is an incident of every independent nation. It is part of its independence.”); Fong Yue
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (holding that the right to deport foreign aliens
already in the country “rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute and unqualified as the
right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country”).
77
See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 524–26 (2003).
78
See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (U.S.
Constitution has no force “in foreign territory unless in respect of our citizens”).
75
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territory.79 Most provisions of the Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment, and other individual rights in the Constitution, including the Due
Process Clauses, apply to “persons” rather than “citizens.” 80 Accordingly,
these rights generally protect aliens present in the U.S. as well as citizens.
However, due process guarantees in immigration proceedings are
not equivalent to those applicable in criminal proceedings. Immigration
proceedings “are civil, not criminal, and . . . are nonpunitive in purpose and
effect”81 and do not require the same procedural safeguards as criminal proceedings. The courts also have drawn distinctions between the process that
is due to aliens excludable prior to admission into the U.S. and the process
due to aliens subject to deportation after entry.82 Because the regulation of
aliens is related to issues of national security and foreign relations, U.S.
courts have shown deference to the judgment of Congress and the President
in these matters.83
79

See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990); Wong Wing v.
United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
80
See U.S. CONST. amend V; but see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (defining “citizenship”). Aliens are not afforded the rights that are limited to citizens such as those in the Privileges and Immunities Clauses. Cf. id. (explicitly prohibiting abridging the rights of citizens
only).
81
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
82
See, e.g., id. at 678, 679, 719–21 (distinguishing Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), and concluding that “[t]he distinction between an alien who has
effected an entry into the United States and one who has never entered runs throughout immigration law” and “once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the
Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary or permanent”). The question of whether the Due Process Clause provides protection to aliens held outside the U.S. but on territory
over which the U.S. exercises exclusive authority and control was recently before the Supreme Court. See Brief for Petitioner at i, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2007) (No.
06-1195). Although the Court did not explicitly hold that the protections of the Due Process
Clause apply to aliens held in such circumstances, it did hold that the protections of the Suspension Clause apply, and that the limited process established by the Detainee Treatment Act
to review Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) determinations was a constitutionally
inadequate substitute for the habeas review to which the petitioners were entitled. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2244–2262 (2008). See infra note 110 for a discussion of
CSRTs.
83
See, e.g., Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as alien denied entry is concerned”); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, §§ 721 and 722 (and comments and notes thereto) (the U.S. may deport permanent resident aliens even if the person
peacefully resided in the U.S. for many years if sufficient procedural safeguards are followed; such aliens can be deported even for activities that Congress could not define and
punish as a crime, such as political activities otherwise protected by the first amendment).
The Court also has broadly continued to affirm the broad powers of the political branches
with regard to immigration controls, including upholding the more controversial ideological
provisions found in the national security grounds for removal, and even in cases involving
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Still, when it comes to preventive detention of removable (that is,
excludable or deportable) aliens, the Supreme Court has taken a more rigorous approach in recent years in recognition of due process concerns. Under
U.S. immigration law, aliens ordered removed from the U.S. are detained
for up to 90-days during a statutory “removal period” after the removal order has been issued.84 The immigration law also authorizes further detention
of certain removable aliens whose removal is not accomplished during the
removal period.85 Prior to 2001, the U.S. immigration authorities maintained
a practice pursuant to this statute of indefinitely detaining these categories
of removable aliens if not removed during the statutory 90-day “removal
period.”86
In June 2001, the Court limited this practice in Zadvydas v. Davis, a
case involving two resident aliens ordered removed due to convictions for
aggravated crimes.87 To avoid a constitutional due process problem, the
Court read the statute to “limit[] an alien’s post-removal-period detention to
a period reasonably necessary to bring about that that alien’s removal from
the United States. [The statute] does not permit indefinite detention.”88 The
Court also imposed a 180-day period during which post-removal detention
is presumptively valid, but after which the government generally must show
evidence of a significant likelihood of removal in the foreseeable future in
order to continue the detention.89
The Court compelled these requirements even though eventual removal of the alien remained possible, good faith efforts at removal continued, and the detention underwent periodic administrative review.90 The
Court held that these considerations were outweighed by the fact that “the
civil confinement at issue is not limited, but potentially permanent,”91 and
longtime lawful resident aliens. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
84
8 U.S.C. § 1232 (2006).
85
See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)(2006); see also DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REPORT OIG-07-28, ICE’S COMPLIANCE WITH DETENTION
LIMITS FOR ALIENS WITH A FINAL ORDER OF REMOVAL FROM THE UNITED STATES 3–4 (Feb.
2007) [hereinafter DHS OIG Report]. The provision of the statute allowing for extended
post-removal period detention applies to aliens who are: (1) inadmissible; (2) removable as a
result of violations of entry conditions, violations of criminal law, or reasons of national
security or foreign policy; or (3) represent a threat to the community or a flight risk if released. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
86
See DHS OIG Report, supra note 85, at 3.
87
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
88
Id. at 689.
89
See id. at 701. In some cases, the government is not required to release an alien who was
not removed after 180 days. Id.
90
See id. at 685, 696.
91
Id. at 691.
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“[t]he provision authorizing detention does not apply narrowly to ‘a small
segment of particularly dangerous individuals,’ say suspected terrorists, but
broadly to aliens ordered removed for many and various reasons, including
tourist visa violations.”92 Further, “the sole procedural protections available
to the alien are found in administrative proceedings, where the alien bears
the burden of proving he is not dangerous, without . . . significant later judicial review. . . . [T]he Constitution may well preclude granting an administrative body the unreviewable authority to make determinations implicating
fundamental rights.”93 Once again considerations about whether the detention power was narrowly tailored to a specially dangerous class of persons,
and subject to adequate procedural safeguards, guided the Court’s decision.
Yet, despite these due process concerns, the Court indicated that the restrictions imposed would not necessarily apply in a case that involves a suspected terrorist alien or a case that raises other national security concerns.
Indeed, the Zadvydas Court stressed that it was not considering “terrorism or other special circumstances where special arguments might be
made for forms of preventive detention and for heightened deference to the
judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of national security.”94 And when the Court extended the Zadvydas rule to inadmissible
aliens in Clark v. Martinez, it took pains to point out that “sustained detention of alien terrorists is a ‘special arrangement’ authorized by a different
statutory provision.”95 Moreover, the Court held that the capacity of Congress to “secur[e] our borders” against non-removable aliens
is demonstrated by [the fact that] [l]ess than four months after the release
of our opinion [in Zadvydas], Congress enacted a statute which expressly
authorized continued detention, for a period of six months beyond the removal period (and renewable indefinitely), of any alien (1) whose removal
is not reasonably foreseeable and (2) who presents a national security
threat or has been involved in terrorist activities.96

The U.S. government also adopted this approach in immigration
regulations issued after the Zadvydas case. The regulations established three
categories of aliens who may be detained beyond the presumptive 180-day
92

Id. (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368 (1997) (emphasis added)).
Id. at 692 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Cf. Rasul v. Bush, 452 U.S. 466
(2004) (holding that U.S. district courts can hear habeas corpus petitions from aliens captured on a battlefield and detained at a location over which the U.S. exercises plenary jurisdiction, albeit on statutory rather than constitutional grounds).
94
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696. The Supreme Court, interpreting the Attorney General’s
authority to detain aliens, noted that “if Congress had meant to authorize long-term detention
of unremovable aliens, it certainly could have spoken in clearer terms.” Id. at 697.
95
Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 379, n.4 (2005).
96
Id. at 386, n.8 (citing USA PATRIOT Act § 412(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(6)(2001)).
93
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period even if not likely to be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future,
including aliens: (1) who have highly contagious diseases; (2) whose release
may cause serious adverse foreign policy consequences; and (3) who are
being detained for national security or terrorism concerns.97
4.

Enemy combatants

Enemy combatants also are subject to preventive detention absent
conviction in a criminal proceeding.98 The Supreme Court has repeatedly
upheld the preventive detention of enemy combatants under the customary
law of armed conflict, which helps to explain the robust efforts of the U.S.
government to apply this legal paradigm to the problem of international
terrorism in the wake of 9/11. The application of this customary power to
certain international terrorist suspects (U.S. citizens and non-citizens alike)
was squarely addressed by the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.99 The
Court, in a plurality opinion, held that the Authorization for Use of Military
Force (AUMF) provided “explicit congressional authorization for the detention” of “individuals who fought against the United States in Afghanistan as
part of the Taliban, an organization known to have supported the al Qaeda
terrorist network responsible for those attacks,”100 and that “the AUMF satisfied [the Non-Detention Act’s] requirement that a detention be ‘pursuant
to an Act of Congress’ (assuming, without deciding, that [the NonDetention Act] applies to military detentions).”101 According to the Court,
“[t]he capture and detention of lawful combatants and the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by universal agreement and practice,
are important incidents of war. The purpose of detention is to prevent cap97

8 C.F.R. § 241.14(a)–(d) (2001); DHS OIG REPORT, supra note 85, at 4–5. Certification
that an alien meets one or more of these criteria requires substantial factual support and approval by senior government officials. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.14. The statute also allows for
detention of aliens determined to be “specially dangerous” beyond the 180-day presumptive
period; however, during 2008 two Federal courts held that this provision of the statute was
unconstitutional. See Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478 (5th Cir. 2008); Hernandez-Carrera v.
Carlson, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (D. Kan. 2008).
98
During times of war Congress may also authorize the detention of “alien enemies,”
meaning “[s]ubjects of a foreign state at war with the United States.” Johnson v. Eisentrager,
339 U.S. 763, 769, n.2 (1950) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Techt v. Hughes,
128 N.E. 185, 186 (1920)); see also Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) (approving
executive power to detain enemy aliens in times of war).
99
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion).
100
Id. at 518. Congress adopted the AUMF in September 2001. Id. The AUMF empowered
the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force” against “nations, organizations, or
persons” that he determines “planned, authorized, committed, or aided” in the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks. Id. (citing Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 10740, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)).
101
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517.
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tured individuals from returning to the field of battle and taking up arms
once again.”102 Moreover, “there is no bar to this Nation’s holding one of its
own citizens as an enemy combatant . . . . A citizen, no less than an alien,
can be ‘part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition
partners’ and ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United States”;
“such a citizen, if released, would pose the same threat of returning to the
front during the ongoing conflict.”103
But just as we have seen under the other categories of preventive
detention, the Court limited this power in three important substantive or
procedural regards. First, the Court acknowledged Hamdi’s concern for the
“substantial prospect of indefinite detention” given that “the national security underpinnings of the ‘war on terror,’ although crucially important, [were]
broad and malleable” and reflective of the unconventional nature of the conflict at issue.104 Much like in the Salerno case, the Court resolved this issue
by differentiating between indefinite detention and detention with an uncertain end. Hamdi’s detention could only last as long as “the record establishes that United States troops are still involved in active combat in Afghanistan.”105 While this period had no fixed end date, the period’s end date could
be determined with relative certainty, and thus was not an “indefinite” period in the Court’s view. Nonetheless, the Court emphasized that it affirmed
the detention power “based on long-standing law of war principles” and
“[i]f the practical circumstances of a given conflict [were] entirely unlike
those of the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that
understanding [would] unravel.”106 Second, the Court specifically stated that
“indefinite detention for the purpose of interrogation is not authorized.”107
Third, the Court concluded that a citizen such as Hamdi, who disputed the
enemy combatant designation underlying his detention, was entitled to notice of the factual basis for his detention and a meaningful opportunity to
challenge his detention before a neutral decision maker.108 While recognizing these procedural safeguards, the Court acknowledged that under some
circumstances such proceedings could be tailored to the situation; evidentiary rules, burdens of proof and other aspects of such a hearing might be

102

Id. at 515 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Note that the Hamdi case
involved a U.S. citizen captured on foreign soil. The same power of detention, however,
applies to foreign nationals who satisfy the Court’s descriptive category.
103
Id. at 519.
104
Id. at 520.
105
Id. at 521.
106
Id. (noting that Afghanistan was similar to conflicts that contributed to the development
of the law of war because “[a]ctive combat operations” continued in Afghanistan).
107
Id.
108
Id. at 533.
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significantly altered from those applicable in criminal proceedings.109 The
Court noted, however, that Hamdi’s right to an attorney in such proceedings
was “unquestionabl[e].”110
In Padilla v. Hanft, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit closely followed the Hamdi decision, permitting enemy
combatant detention of a U.S. citizen who took up arms against the United
States in Afghanistan on behalf of the Taliban.111 Padilla left the battlefield
in Afghanistan for the alleged purpose of carrying out terrorist attacks on
U.S. soil, and was initially arrested by civilian law enforcement authorities
upon his arrival in the U.S.112 However, as discussed above, the Fourth Circuit later initially refused to extend this power to sanction enemy combatant
detention of the resident alien in the al-Marri case, reasoning that Hamdi
and Padilla stand for the proposition that “who fits within the ‘legal category’ of enemy combatant . . . rest[s] . . . on affiliation with the military arm
of an enemy nation.”113 According to the court, al-Marri did not qualify for
the enemy combatant “exception to the usual criminal process” because,
unlike Hamdi and Padilla, al-Marri was not alleged to have taken up arms
against the U.S. in Afghanistan on behalf of the Taliban or “to have engaged
in combat with United States forces anywhere in the world.”114 Indeed, the
court explicitly rejected the government’s argument that “al-Marri’s seizure
and indefinite military detention . . . are justified because he engaged in, and
continues to pose a very real threat of carrying out, . . . acts of international

109

Id. at 533–34.
Id. at 539. The U.S. government responded to the Hamdi decision and to the decision of
the Court in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), by instituting Combatant Status Review
Tribunals (CSRTs) for enemy combatants held in the war on terror. COMBATANT STATUS
REVIEW TRIBUNALS, Sept. 28, 2006, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2007/CSRT%20
%Fact%Sheet.pdf. Among other things, the CSRTs provide for the right to: (1) review the
unclassified basis for the detainees detention; (2) have hearing in front of a tribunal of neutral military officers; (3) testify or introduce documentary evidence; (4) call (if reasonably
available) and question witnesses before the tribunal; (5) attend all proceedings except when
matters that would compromise national security are involved; (6) receive assistance of an
appointed personal representative; and (7) submit the tribunal decision to automatic review
by a higher authority. See, e.g., Memorandum from Gordon England, U.S. Deputy Secretary
of Defense, to Secretary of the Military Departments Joint Chief of Staff Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for
Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (July 14, 2006),
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Aug2006/d20060809CSRTProcedures.pdf.
111
See Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005).
112
Id.
113
Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 182 (4th Cir. 2007).
114
Id. at 183.
110
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terrorism” on behalf of al Qaeda.115 Thus, the Fourth Circuit panel would
not extend the “special justification” of enemy combatant status to a person
alleged only to be an operative of a non-state international terrorist organization such as al Qaeda.116
In sum, preventive detention in the U.S. generally requires not just a
finding of dangerousness, but a finding of dangerousness combined with:
(1) adequate procedural safeguards; and (2) some “special justification”
such as mental illness, incompetence, abnormality, lack of control, communicable disease, or special status as an alien or enemy.117 Potentially indefinite detention is particularly suspicious.
In light of these cases, the question becomes whether ties to terrorism suffice as an appropriate “special justification” and, if so, what procedural safeguards should apply?
C.

Does Terrorism Pose the “Special Danger” Required by the U.S.
Supreme Court?

In the Zadvydas and Clark cases, the Supreme Court suggested that
terrorism indeed may justify an exception to the general rule against indefinite preventive detention, particularly where aliens are involved. On the
other hand, the Fourth Circuit panel in the al-Marri case explicitly held that
115

Al-Marri, 487 F.3d at 183–84 (internal quotation and alteration omitted) (“[T]he government is mistaken in its representation that Hamdi and Padilla recognized [t]he President’s
authority to detain ‘enemy combatants’ during the current conflict with al Qaeda. No
precedent recognizes any such authority.”) (internal quotations omitted).
116
Again, the original al-Marri decision, which was issued by a split panel, was vacated
and reheard en banc. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008). Unlike the original panel, the en banc court held that al-Marri could be held as an enemy combatant, assuming the government’s allegations about his conduct were true. Id. at 216–17. In fact, Judge
Traxler, the sole member of the court concurring in all aspects of the en banc judgment,
vehemently disagreed with the original panel’s premise that “because al Qaeda is not technically in control of an enemy nation or its government, it cannot be considered as anything
other than a criminal organization whose members are entitled to all the protections and
procedures granted by our constitution. . . . [A]l Qaeda is much more and much worse than a
criminal organization. And while it may be an unconventional enemy force in a historical
context, it is an enemy force nonetheless.” Id. at 160 (Traxler, J., concurring). The al-Marri
case is subject to further proceedings on remand, see supra note 41, and the tension about the
proper application of LOAC doctrines to a conflict as unconventional as the global campaign
against international terrorism is not likely to go away soon. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court
has recently agreed to review the al-Marri case during the 2008 term. See Robert Barnes,
Justices to Decide Legality of Indefinite Detention, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2008, at A2.
117
See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690–91 (2001) (“[W]e have upheld preventive
detention based on dangerousness only when limited to specially dangerous individuals and
subject to strong procedural protections . . . . In cases in which preventive detention is of
potentially indefinite duration, we have also demanded that the dangerousness rationale be
accompanied by some other special circumstance, such as mental illness, that helps to create
the danger.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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alleged involvement with international terrorism is insufficient to warrant
extension of the enemy combatant exception, even to an alien, and a similar
argument was raised by the petitioners in Boumediene v. Bush.118 Can terrorism qualify as a sufficient special danger justifying preventive detention?
Concerns about both security and liberty strongly suggest the answer is “Yes.” As recounted earlier, international terrorism poses significant
investigative and prosecutorial challenges that the ordinary criminal justice
system is not equipped to handle. And, as former U.S. Attorney Mary Jo
White has indicated, the ordinary criminal justice system is not capable of
deterring large numbers of committed extremists who are “willing, indeed
anxious, to die in service of their cause.”119 Furthermore, the nature and
magnitude of the injury that modern international terrorist organizations
seek to inflict is categorically different from the harms that the ordinary
criminal justice system was designed to remedy. It seems clear that (the
Fourth Circuit’s initial al-Marri panel notwithstanding) individual operatives of sub-state terrorist organizations can pose the kind of special danger
the Supreme Court has identified. For example, suppose that the U.S. government—using sensitive, credible, but ultimately inadmissible intelligence
information—succeeded in disrupting an al Qaeda plot to simultaneously fly
multiple airliners into iconic buildings in various U.S. cities, and the operatives involved were U.S. citizens and/or aliens who never fought against the
U.S. forces in Afghanistan or elsewhere.

118

The Boumediene petitioners argued, among other things, that their detention as enemy
combatants was illegal. They contended that aliens allegedly connected to al Qaeda, but
arrested by civilian police in a friendly country and not alleged to have participated directly
in armed combat against the U.S., do not satisfy the enemy combatant exception pursuant to
the AUMF and Hamdi. Further, they argued that the CSRT process established in the wake
of Hamdi did not provide meaningful notice of the basis of detention, an opportunity to be
heard, representation by counsel, or a neutral decision maker, which they claimed are required by Fifth Amendment due process. The government strongly disagreed, arguing that
petitioners were aliens detained outside the U.S. and as such were not entitled to constitutional due process guarantees, and that in any event the CSRT process provided even more
due process than Hamdi required for U.S. citizens held as enemy combatants or than is provided under the process in place to comply with Article 5 of the Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. See Briefs for Petitioner and Respondent, Boumediene
v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008) (No. 06-1195). In its decision, the Court declined to address
whether the President had authority to detain the petitioners. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct.
2229, 2240 (2008). Moreover, the Court rendered no judgment as to whether the CSRTs
satisfy due process standards. Id. at 2270. The Court did hold, however, that the petitioners
were entitled to constitutional habeas review and to protection of the Suspension Clause, and
that the limited process established by the Detainee Treatment Act to review CSRT determinations was a constitutionally inadequate substitute for such habeas review. Id. at 2244–
2262.
119
Mary Jo White, Prosecuting Terrorism in the Criminal Justice System, XV(1) ARMS
CONTROL, DISARMAMENT, AND INT’L SECURITY 3, 8 (2003).
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The al-Marri case seems to direct that, absent criminal prosecution,
those involved must be released or, if aliens, deported. Preventive detention
would be impossible. This outcome seems inappropriate and unnecessary.120
Moreover, the liberty concerns underlying al-Marri and other cases also
favor a preventive detention system (with strong substantive and procedural
safeguards built in) to handle terrorism cases that do not easily fit within the
traditional categories of detention, lest the pressures on the traditional law
enforcement and enemy combatant models permanently warp the principles
that underlie them.
II. A “SECURITY DETENTION ACT” FOR THE U.S.?
If terrorism does represent the special danger that justifies preventive detention, then one must ask what such a security detention system for
terrorist suspects would look like? The foregoing analysis of U.S. and international law, and a review of several preventive detention programs proposed or adopted by other countries,121 identifies eight fundamental issues
that must be addressed in any legislation of this type.
A.

Nature of the System

Legislation must address the nature of the system. To this point, this
article has discussed exclusively actual physical detention of terrorist suspects. Israel’s Administrative Detention Act employs this approach. However, several systems adopted in recent years provide control options that
represent a less drastic intrusion of the liberty interest at stake. For example,
both the United Kingdom and Australia have enacted legislation permitting
authorities to impose “control orders” on terrorist suspects without subject120

As Justice John Paul Stevens acknowledged when the Padilla case initially reached the
Supreme Court in 2004, “[e]xecutive detention of subversive citizens, like detention of enemy soldiers to keep them off the battlefield, may sometimes be justified to prevent persons
from launching or becoming missiles of destruction.” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 465
(2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121
The preventive detention schemes reviewed for this article include the system of derogating and non-derogating control orders established by the United Kingdom’s Prevention of
Terrorism Act 2005, c. 2 (Eng.); the system of control orders and preventive detention orders
established by Australia’s Anti-Terrorism Act (No. 2), 2005, c. 144 (Austl.); Israel’s Emergency Powers (Detention) Law 1979, 33 L.S.I. 89 (1978-99), reprinted in Emanual Gross,
Human Rights, Terrorism and the Problem of Administrative Detention in Israel: Does a
Democracy Have the Right to Hold Terrorists as Bargaining Chips?, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 721 (2001); and the system of investigative hearings and recognizance orders contemplated by Canada’s Bill S-3, see LAURA BARNETT, AN ACT TO AMEND THE CRIMINAL
CODE, (INVESTIGATIVE HEARING AND RECOGNIZANCE WITH CONDITIONS), LS-574E, at 3–6
(2008), available at http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Docid=3
334060&file=4, as adopted by the Canadian Senate on March 6, 2008 and on first reading in
the Canadian House of Commons.
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ing them to arrest or detention.122 The Parliament of Canada is presently
considering123 a system of “recognizance” orders that are very similar.
Control order schemes allow imposition of a broad range of restrictions and prohibitions,124 and generally provide an option that is subject to
fewer procedural safeguards than actual physical detention. However, the
British, Australian, and Canadian control order systems also authorize more
drastic measures under certain circumstances. Under the U.K. legislation,
the government may at times seek a control order that derogates from the
U.K.’s arrest and detention obligations under Article 5 of the European
Convention on Human Rights.125 Similarly, the Australian and the Canadian
122

The United Kingdom’s Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act permitted the U.K. to
deport aliens who were suspected international terrorists, or to detain such aliens indefinitely
where deportation could not be accomplished. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001,
c. 24 §§ 22–23 (Eng.). If either an international legal obligation or a practical consideration
(for example, human rights concerns in the receiving country, documentation issues, etc.)
prevented removal pursuant to such an order, the U.K. authorities were authorized to detain
the suspected terrorist indefinitely. Id. In December 2004, the U.K. House of Lords invalidated the alien detention provisions of the ATCSA. A v. Secretary of State [2004] UKHL 56.
The Lords ruled that the detention provisions, in particular the indefinite detention provisions, violated the European Convention on Human Rights in that their effect on foreign
nationals was a disproportionate, irrational, and discriminatory deprivation of liberty compared to the threat posed by foreign nationals. Id. In response to the House of Lords judgment, the British Parliament enacted the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (PTA), which
explicitly repealed the detention provisions of the ATCSA and instituted the current system
of derogating and non-derogating control orders. Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c. 2
(Eng.).
123
The Canadian legislation is largely identical to the system enacted by Canada’s AntiTerrorism Act of 2001, which expired after five years and was not immediately reauthorized. Compare Anti-terrorism Act, 2001 S.C., c. 41 (Can.), with BARNETT, supra note
121.
124
Examples include restrictions on movement, premises, communications, associations,
activities, use or possession of articles or substances, and the wearing of electronic tracking
devices. See, e.g., Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c. 2 (Eng.).
125
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c.2, § 1 (Eng.). Article 5 of the European Convention
on Human Rights stipulates that “[n]o one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases,” which include: (1) detention upon criminal conviction; (2) detention for noncompliance with a lawful court order; (3) criminal pre-trial detention; (4) detention of a
minor for educational supervision; (5) detention of the mentally ill, controlled substance
abusers, and those with infectious diseases; and (6) detention with a view toward deportation
or extradition. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as
Amended by Protocol No. 11 art. 5(1), Nov. 1, 1998, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. A control order that
impinges these rights is called a “derogating” order under the U.K. system, and must be
imposed by a court. Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c.2, § 4 (Eng.). An order that imposes restrictions but that does not violate the person’s rights relating to physical arrest and
detention is called a “non-derogating” order, and may be imposed by the Secretary of State
for the Home Department. Id. § 2. However, it seems at least one U.K. court has held that
certain orders imposed by the government, though styled as non-derogating orders, impose
restrictions that in fact amount to deprivation of liberty prohibited by the arrest and detention
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legislation each permit physical detention in exigent circumstances.126 Control order systems also provide that failure to observe the conditions imposed by the order, or obstruction of those exercising the control order powers, may be grounds for arrest, detention, and potential imprisonment.127
The dual approach of control order systems is appealing in light of
the U.S. case law outlined above. The ability to impose lesser intrusions on
all but the most dangerous suspects works to limit the class of potential detainees in the manner required by the Supreme Court. Moreover, less intrusive restrictions generally require less burdensome procedural guarantees.
B.

Definitional Threshold

Any new security detention system should not broadly authorize detention for anyone who poses a threat to national security. Rather, preventive detention should be available only for those individuals who represent
the central threat of modern terrorism and who cannot be handled without
straining ordinary criminal justice processes or law of armed conflict doctrines. One of the principal concerns with the U.S.’s current multi-prong
approach to the detention of terror suspects is that it has ensnared individuals and conduct that are increasingly remote from the primary terrorist actors and activities. Similarly, the Supreme Court has expressed concern with
preventive detention schemes that define the pool of potential detainees too
broadly.128 If suspected involvement with international terrorism is to justify
preventive detention outside one of the existing categories, the definitional
threshold must be strict.
A comparison of other systems is instructive. Israel, for example,
permits administrative detention of anyone when reasonable cause exists to
believe that reasons of State security or public security require detention.129
While this is an exceptionally broad threshold, it is subject to some limitations. For example, administrative detention can only occur during a state of
emergency (which has existed continuously in Israel since 1948), and may
be imposed only if it is the sole means available to detain the person,130
meaning that criminal prosecution must not be a practical option.
provisions of Article 5, not merely a restriction of liberty. See JJ and Others v. Sec’y of State
for the Home Dep’t, [2006] EWHC 1623.
126
Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2), 2005, § 105.4, sched. 4 (Austl.); Anti-terrorism Act, 2001
S.C., c. 41, § 4 (Can.).
127
E.g., Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2), 2005, § 104.27, sched. 4 (Austl.); Anti-terrorism,
Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 2 § 9 (Eng.).
128
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 51–52, 58-63, 66–74, 87–93.
129
Israel’s Emergency Powers (Detention) Law 1979, 33 L.S.I. 89 (1978–99), reprinted in
Gross, supra note 121, at 725.
130
Id.
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The threshold for imposition of a control order in Britain depends
on the nature of the order and reflects the different restrictions of liberty at
stake. Derogating orders may be confirmed by the court only if: (1) it is
more probable than not that the person is or has been “involved in terrorismrelated activity”; (2) the obligations imposed are necessary to protect members of the public from a risk of terrorism; (3) the risk at issue is associated
with a public emergency for which the government has issued a formal notice of derogation from all or part of Article 5 of the ECHR; and (4) the
obligations imposed by the order are among those listed in the government’s
derogation notice.131 Non-derogating control orders, however, have a lesser
threshold. The Secretary of State may issue a non-derogating control order
if he: (1) has reasonable grounds to suspect that the person is or has been
“involved in terrorism-related activity”; and (2) considers the imposition of
the order and the obligations it imposes necessary to protect the public from
a risk of terrorism.132 But, much like Israel, where the “involvement with
terrorist-related activity” that gives rise to a control order suggests the
commission of a criminal offense, the Secretary of State must consult with
police and prosecution officials before making or applying for the order to
determine if evidence exists that could realistically be used to prosecute the
subject of the order for an offense related to terrorism.133 If the order is issued, the police officials must continue to investigate to determine if prosecution becomes possible during the duration of the order.134
The Australian system seems to have the highest threshold to obtain
a control order. A federal police officer may apply for a preventive detention order with respect to a person for either of two reasons: (1) if he reasonably suspects that the person “will engage in a terrorist act, possesses a
thing connected with the preparation for, or engagement … in, a terrorist
131

Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c.2, § 4 (Eng.).
Id. The terms “involvement in terrorism-related activity” and “terrorism” are defined
very broadly. “Involvement in terrorism-related activity” means: (a) the commission, preparation or instigation of terrorism; (b) facilitating, encouraging, or intending to facilitate or
encourage the same; or (c) giving support or assistance to those known or believed to be
involved in terrorism-related activity. It does not matter if the foregoing conduct relates to a
specific act of terrorism, or to terrorism in general. See Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005,
c.2, § 1.9 (Eng.). “Terrorism” has the same meaning as in the Terrorism Act 2000, which
defines the term as the use or threat of action that (a) involves serious violence against a
person, involves serious damage to property, endangers a person’s life, creates a serious risk
to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or is designed seriously to
interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system; (b) is designed to influence the
government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public; and (c) is made for the
purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, §
1(Eng.).
133
See Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c.2, § 8 (Eng.).
134
See id.
132
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act,” or has taken an action in preparation for a terrorist act; or (2) if a terrorist act has occurred within the past 28 days and detention of the person
for the period imposed is reasonably necessary to preserve evidence relating
to the act.135 A future terrorist act must be imminent, meaning at the most it
is expected to occur within the following 14 days.136
C.

Duration of Detention

Any new legislation on preventive detention must address the duration of detention. As discussed, the U.S. Supreme Court has demonstrated a
decided bias against indefinite detention, particularly absent the existence of
some special factor that both narrowly limits the class of people to which
the detention potentially applies and confirms the heightened danger that
class poses, as well as the existence of strict procedural safeguards. Thus,
potentially lengthy detention periods require a stricter definitional threshold
and more robust procedural safeguards.
The foreign detention schemes reviewed for this article vary broadly in potential duration. For example, preventive detention orders in Australia may not exceed 48 hours and are subject to restrictions on the imposition of multiple detention orders.137 In contrast, detention orders under
Israel’s Administrative Detention Act may be imposed for up to six months
and are renewable indefinitely for successive six-month periods.138 In Britain, duration depends on the nature of the control order, again reflecting the
degree of infringement of the person’s liberty. Non-derogating control orders in Britain last for up to 12 months and are renewable for successive 12month periods, while derogating control orders may be issued for six-month
periods, subject to renewal by the court.139 Further, the legislation provides
that persons may be arrested and detained for up to 96 hours during the
pendency of an application for a derogating control order.140
D.

Appropriate Decision-maker

Preventative detention legislation must authorize an official to impose the detention. Most foreign preventive detention systems involve an
initial determination made by order of a competent and independent judicial
135

Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2), 2005, § 105.4, sched. 4 (Austl.).
Id.
137
Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2), 2005, § 105.1, sched. 4 (Austl.). (“[T]he object of this [Act]
is to allow a person to be taken into custody and detained for a short period of time . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
138
Israel’s Emergency Powers (Detention) Law 1979, 33 L.S.I. 89 (1978-99), reprinted in
Gross, supra note 121, at 725.
139
See Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c.2, §§ 2, 4 (Eng.).
140
See Id. § 5.
136
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official upon application of an executive official at a sufficiently high level
to provide subsequent accountability. In urgent circumstances, however,
provisions are usually made for an initial detention decision by an appropriately high-ranking executive official, with subsequent confirmation by a
judicial authority.141
E.

Nature of Process, Including Standard of Proof, Evidentiary Rules,
and Detainee Rights

A security detention system also should specify any detainee rights
and the procedural safeguards associated with the protection and exercise of
detainee rights. As outlined earlier, notice of the basis for detention and the
ability to seek independent review are basic standards.142 Other important
issues include a detainee’s right to counsel, standards and burdens of proof,
evidentiary rules on admissibility and reliability, rules for the use and protection of classified information, rules regarding the interrogation of detainees, presence of counsel during interrogation, and the permitted uses of
information obtained from such interrogation. Israel, Australia, and the U.K.
each provide different procedural safeguards and assurances of a detainee’s
rights.
In Israel, an administrative detainee must be brought before a district court judge within 48 hours or be released.143 While the detainee has
the right to know the basis for his detention, to have access to counsel, and
to be present and have counsel present at the judicial confirmation hearing,
the detention court may rely on hearsay and other evidence, if such evidence
is deemed reliable, even if that evidence would ordinarily be inadmissible in
criminal proceedings.144 The court also may order sensitive evidence with-

141

For example, in Israel’s administrative detention may occur upon an order issued by the
Minister of Defense, subject to judicial confirmation. See Israel’s Emergency Powers (Detention) Law 1979, 33 L.S.I. 89 (1978–99), reprinted in Gross, supra note 121, at 725. In Australia, a federal police officer may apply to a senior police official for a preventive detention
order lasting up to 24 hours. Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2), 2005, § 105.8, sched. 4 (Austl.). A
judge or federal magistrate may extend a preventive detention order for up to a total of 48
hours. Id. § 105.12. In Britain, under normal circumstances, the Secretary of State for the
Home Department may apply to a court for imposition of a non-derogating control order.
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c.2, § 2 (Eng.). The Secretary of State may issue a nonderogating control order in urgent circumstances, subject to subsequent confirmation by the
court. Id. Control orders that derogate from Article 5 of the ECHR may only be issued, regardless of circumstances, by a court. Id. § 1(2).
142
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 48–52, 58–63, 66–74, 87–93, 104–09.
143
Israel’s Emergency Powers (Detention) Law 1979, 33 L.S.I. 89 (1978–99), reprinted in
Gross, supra note 121, at 756.
144
Israel’s Emergency Powers (Detention) Law 1979, 33 L.S.I. 89 (1978–99), reprinted in
Gross, supra note 121, at 773.
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held from a detainee if disclosure would threaten national security.145
Commentators suggest that the applicable evidentiary standard is generally
accepted to be a “clear and convincing” standard and that more evidence is
thought to be required as a practical matter the longer detention continues (a
proportionality rule of sorts).146
Australian detainees and their lawyers must be given a copy of the
detention order and a summary of the grounds for detention.147 Detainees
have the right to contact lawyers, family members, and employers for limited purposes, and to contact the police Ombudsman.148 However, the
government may seek an order restricting the person’s ability to contact
virtually any person, including particular family members and particular
attorneys, and the content of a detainee’s communications may be monitored.149 The Australian Act specifically requires that a person detained under the Act must be treated humanely and may not be subjected to any cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment.150 The government may not question a
detainee during detention, for law enforcement or intelligence purposes,151
145

Id.
See id. at 773–74.
147
Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2), 2005, § 105.32, sched. 4 (Austl.).
148
Id. §§ 105.35–105.37.
149
Id. §§ 105.34–38.The content of such communications with a lawyer may not, however,
be admitted in any criminal proceedings. Id. Family members, lawyers and others may be
subject to up to five years imprisonment for improperly disclosing information pertaining to
a detention order. Id. § 105.41.
150
Id. § 105.33.
151
Considering that the justification for preventive detention is the potential dangerousness
of the detainee and not his intelligence value, some systems impose strict limits on intelligence interrogations of detainees. See, e.g., id. a § 105.42. But the issue of interrogation of
detainees, particularly for intelligence purposes, is important and must be resolved. Many of
the procedural and substantive rights associated with preventive detention programs may
prove problematic for intelligence gathering, which is a critical element of the new prevention imperative. For example, most experienced interrogators maintain that isolation can be
among the most useful interrogation techniques, and interruption of the interrogation process
(for example, to meet with legal counsel) can negatively impact information gathering. See,
e.g., Paul Rosenzweig & James Jay Carafano, Preventive Detention and Actionable Intelligence, 13 LEGAL MEMORANDUM 1 (The Heritage Found., Washington, D.C.), Sept. 16, 2004,
at 3, available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/lm13.cfm. Professors
Goldsmith and Katyal have suggested a system of delayed access to counsel to permit limited
interrogation as a possible solution. Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, Op-Ed, The Terrorists’ Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A19. One potential solution might involve a
process modeled on that used in Spain, where terrorism suspects may be held in police custody for up to five days before a decision to commence criminal proceedings is made. Maria
Alvanou, Terrorism Legislation Issues in Spain: Terrorism Offenses and ‘Incommunicado’
Procedures, RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN STUDIES, 2007,
http:/rieas.gr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=405&Itemid=41. The person
may be held incommunicado during that period pursuant to court authorization. Id. Moreover, the incommunicado period may be extended for an additional eight days if the decision
146
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except to confirm identity and safety, and any questioning must be videotaped.
Once again, the rights and procedures applicable under Britain’s
control order system vary with the nature of the order. The subject of any
control order must be informed of the imposition of a control order.152 For
non-derogating control orders, the court may conduct an ex parte hearing of
the government’s basis for issuing the order.153 If convinced that the government’s decision is not “obviously flawed,” the court must conduct a full
hearing to determine the appropriateness of the order and the obligations
imposed.154 At the full hearing, the court must determine whether the government’s decision was flawed in respect of any of the following issues: (1)
the existence of reasonable grounds to suspect that the person was “involved
in terrorism-related activity”; (2) that a control order was necessary to protect members of the public from the risk of terrorism; or (3) the necessity of
the particular obligations imposed.155 The court may order the government
to revoke or modify the order as appropriate. Non-derogating control orders
issued by the government in exigent circumstances must be referred to the
court immediately, and the court must commence consideration of the order
no more than seven days after the order took effect.156 In the case of derogating control orders, upon application by the British government, the court
will hold an immediate preliminary hearing (which, again, may be ex parte)
to determine if a prima facie case exists for the imposition of an order.157 If
such a case exists, the court will impose the order subject to a subsequent
full hearing.158 At that hearing, the court will confirm the control order only
if it is convinced that the threshold standard has been met and if it has not
been met, the court may quash or modify the obligations originally imposed.159
is made to commence criminal proceedings. Id. During an incommunicado period, a suspect’s relatives may not be informed of the detention and legal services are provided by a
duty solicitor, not an attorney chosen by the suspect. Id. A suspect held incommunicado may
be questioned in the presence of the duty solicitor, who may advise the suspect on matters of
procedure but may not consult privately with the suspect. Id. Note, however, that a forensic
physician is assigned to examine the suspect during the period and ensure the suspect is not
abused, and must make a report to the supervising judicial authority. Id. The suspect may
not see a lawyer of his choosing or notify anyone of his detention until the end of the incommunicado period, which may last a total of thirteen days. Id.
152
See Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c.2, § 7 (Eng.).
153
Id. § 3.
154
Id. § 4.
155
See id.
156
Id. § 3.
157
See id. § 4.
158
Id.
159
Id.
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The British system also addresses a number of evidentiary and related procedural concerns. For example, the Prevention of Terrorism Act
imposes an obligation on the government to disclose all evidence relevant to
the control order proceedings.160 However, the Act directs the courts to establish rules allowing the government to withhold sensitive information
from anyone other than the court or certain qualified lawyers designated as
“special advocates,” and to exclude the controlled person and his legal
counsel from proceedings when considering such evidence.161 In those circumstances, the special advocates shall represent the interests of the controlled person, but shall not be responsible to him or his legal counsel. 162
The British Act does not, however, address the extent to which those subject
to control orders may be interrogated, or any restrictions on potential uses of
the information that may be obtained from interrogation.
U.S. law provides a relevant example of how these issues have been
handled in a non-criminal context involving terrorism and preventive detention. In 1996, as part of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA), the U.S. created a new removal process for aliens called the
Alien Terrorist Removal Court (ATRC), which is comprised of five federal
district court judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.163
ATRC proceedings are available to the government in any case where, on
application by the Attorney General, the Court finds probable cause to believe that: (1) the alien is a terrorist; (2) the alien is present in the U.S.; and
(3) ordinary removal proceedings would pose a risk to national security due
to disclosure of classified information.164
More specifically, the ATRC legislation allows the government to
use classified information to establish grounds for removal without disclosure to the alien if a risk to national security would result. In place of the
160

Id. § 4, sched. Control order proceedings, etc.
Id. §§ 4, 7. When the court opts to withhold evidence, the courts may also provide for
summaries of the sensitive evidence. Id. § 4.
162
Id. § 7.
163
8 U.S.C. § 1532(a)(2000). Recall that removable aliens are detainable pending the removal determination and pending actual removal, particularly in cases involving terrorism.
See supra text accompanying notes 76–83. Note also that the Alien Terrorist Removal Court
provisions rarely, if ever, have been used since their adoption in 1996, primarily because the
provisions’ intricate procedures are considered unworkable, but also in part because of due
process concerns. Steven R. Valentine, Flaws Undermine Use of Alien Terrorist Removal
Court, 17(12) WASH. LEGAL FOUNDATION 1, 2 (2002). One other potential example of how
current U.S. law and practice address these issues is the CSRT. COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW
TRIBUNALS, Sept. 28, 2006, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2007/CSRT%20%Fact%
Sheet.pdf. However, as previously mentioned, the CSRT system continues to face significant
constitutional challenge. The Boumediene case recently decided by the Supreme Court is just
one example. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008).
164
8 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (1996).
161
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classified information, unclassified summaries approved by the court can be
provided to the alien and his attorney. Where unclassified summaries are
not possible, and the alien is a legal permanent resident, special pre-cleared
attorneys who can review the classified material are available.165 The removal hearing may continue without disclosure or summaries if the court
determines that serious and irreparable harm to national security might otherwise result.
The AEDPA also spells out the rights of the aliens in ATRC proceedings, including (1) notice of the nature of charges; (2) a public hearing
and the right to be present at the hearing (except when considering sensitive
information); (3) a compensated right to counsel; and (4) a reasonable opportunity to call and confront witnesses and to offer evidence.166 The government bears the burden of proof in ATRC proceedings under a preponderance of the evidence standard, but the ordinary rules of evidence do not
apply, meaning that the government may use virtually any and all relevant
evidence, including evidence alleged to have been obtained unlawfully.167
F.

Appeals and Periodic Review

Most preventive detention systems provide for rights of appeal and
periodic automatic review of detention. For example, under the British Prevention of Terrorism Act, all persons subject to control orders have a right
of appeal on matters of law.168 Under the ATRC provisions in U.S. law,
removable aliens may appeal the removal determination to the U.S. Court of
Appeals, and in cases involving permanent legal residents the appeal is automatic.169 The standard of review is the same as in criminal proceedings—
de novo review for matters of law, and a clearly erroneous standard for factual matters.170
Automatic periodic review typically involves the same standard
used to impose detention in the first instance, and usually occurs no less
than once each year depending on the intrusiveness of the liberty restriction.
In Israel, administrative detention orders must be reviewed by the court

165

Other options that might be considered in place of such special counsel are a permanent
staff of skilled defense lawyers similar to the Federal Public Defender system, as proposed
by Professors Goldsmith and Katyal, Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, Op-Ed, The Terrorists’ Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A19, or a system of pre-clearance for lawyers who
are not associated with the government but who are experienced human rights practitioners.
166
8 U.S.C. § 1534 (2001).
167
Id.
168
See Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, § 11 (Eng.).
169
8 U.S.C. § 1535 (1996).
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Id.
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every three months.171 In Britain, there is no automatic periodic review during the course of the order, but the order must be affirmatively renewed at
the end of each period for it to continue in effect.172 Persons subject to control orders may seek revocation or modification of the order either from the
government (non-derogating orders) or the court (derogating orders).173
Moreover, the government may revoke or relax a non-derogating control
order at any time, and the court is obligated to revoke a derogating control
order if the derogating restrictions are no longer required.174
G.

Reporting and Oversight

Preventive detention systems also tend to impose oversight and reporting obligations on an appropriate independent authority, such as an Inspector General.175 These provisions usually require periodic evaluation of
the use of the preventive detention powers, the outcome of the detention
proceedings, the nature and conditions of the detention imposed, and any
other material matters associated with the preventive detention program.176
Reports normally must be submitted to a responsible executive agent (such
as a Minister of Justice or State) and to a designated legislative committee.177
For example, in Australia the Attorney General must make an annual report to the Parliament regarding the functioning of the Act, including
the number of orders issued and people detained, the nature of complaints
made by those detained, and the number of detention orders found invalid
by a court, among other issues.178 The British scheme has several periodic
reporting and oversight provisions. For example, the Secretary of State
must provide a report to Parliament on a quarterly basis detailing his use of
the control order powers and appoint an independent reviewer to report on
the operation of the Act and other related matters.179
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Israel’s Emergency Powers (Detention) Law 1979, 33 L.S.I. 89 (1978–99), reprinted in
Gross, supra note 121, at 775.
172
See Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c.2, § 4 (Eng.).
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See id. § 7.
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Id.
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See, e.g., id. § 14.
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See, e.g., Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2), 2005, § 105.47, sched. 4 (Austl.).
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E.g. Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c.2, § 14 (Eng.).
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Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2), 2005, § 105.47, sched. 4 (Austl.).
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Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c.2, § 14 (Eng.).
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Sunset Provisions

Preventive detention systems may be subject to a legislative sunset
provision that requires the systems to cease operation unless reauthorized.180
The sunset provisions, however, vary significantly. For example, the control
order provisions of the British Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 must be
reauthorized annually, subject to approval by the British Parliament.181 By
contrast, the Australian law has a 10-year sunset clause.182
CONCLUSION
The U.S.’s current multi-prong approach to detention of terrorist
suspects has a number of strengths. Its central strength is that it takes advantage of every legal tool available and attempts to use those tools that best fit
the particular situation. It is, in short, fact driven and adaptive. Moreover,
the U.S. approach relies on doctrines and powers that have lengthy pedigrees in U.S. jurisprudence. The detention of material witnesses, for example, dates from Sixteenth Century England and has been permitted under
U.S. law since the first Judiciary Act of 1789.183 The prosecution of wellestablished lesser offenses such as obstruction of justice and document
fraud proved a valuable law enforcement tool in other contexts, such as the
fight against organized crime. Similarly, the right of a nation to detain aliens
that pose serious threats to national security is largely uncontroversial. And
invocation of the right to detain enemy combatants for the duration of hostilities under LOAC is, as the Supreme Court acknowledged in Hamdi, “by
universal agreement and practice [an] important incident[] of war.”184
Nevertheless, the current approach also has many weaknesses.
There is growing concern that these law enforcement, immigration and
LOAC doctrines are being stressed beyond their limit.185 Indeed, Attorney
180

See, e.g., id. § 13; Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2), 2005, § 105.53, sched. 4 (Austl.).
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c.2, § 13 (Eng.).
182
Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2), 2005, § 105.53, sched. 4 (Austl.).
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Stacey M. Studnicki, Material Witness Detention: Justice Served or Denied?, 40
WAYNE L. REV. 1533, 1534–36 (1994) (explaining that the concept of material witnesses
began in England in the 1500s); Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, sec. 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (1789)
(“Recognizances of the witnesses for their appearance to testify . . . may [be] require[d] on
pain of punishment.”).
184
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 517, 518 (2004) (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30
(1942)).
185
For instance, detention of material witnesses was conceived to compel individuals with
relevant testimony to appear as witnesses; detention of material witnesses was not intended
to be a proxy for preventive detention of those considered dangerous to society. See Studnicki, supra note 183, at 1539–37. Because these warrants were conceived for short-term
detention of witnesses, there are few procedural safeguards such as meaningful judicial review or a robust ability to challenge the basis for detention. See id. at 1536–39.
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General Mukasey and the other commentators previously cited seem to have
reached just that conclusion, as did the Fourth Circuit panel in al-Marri.186
The pressure on traditional doctrines to accommodate the challenges of
modern international terrorism tends to skew those doctrines in disturbing
ways. There also is genuine concern in the legal community that the current
approach damages our fundamental rights, and harms our international relationships—the very partnerships the United States must strengthen to effectively defeat al Qaeda and its allies, as well as presently unknown or future
terrorist organizations.
These concerns warrant a call for the U.S. Congress to explore a
new system of security detention for terrorism suspects. It is not entirely
clear that a system of security detention for terrorist suspects would pass
constitutional muster. Whether a sufficient nexus with terrorism would
qualify as a constitutionally permissible “special justification” is largely an
open question, and the adequacy of any procedural safeguards will depend
on the totality of the specific provisions adopted. Further, for such a system
to be of value, it must avoid becoming just one more tool used in the current
ad hoc system. Instead, it must clearly define when it applies and direct the
executive and judicial branches to apply the system in cases that push the
bounds of existing detention categories. This goal is not obviously achievable.187
Moreover, there are countless possible variations on the preventive
detention model that have not been discussed. For instance, a security detention system might concentrate preventive detention decisions, terrorismrelated criminal prosecutions, and other national security matters into specialized national security courts, as several commentators have previously
suggested—a concept with its own set of concerns. However, this approach
might serve to free ordinary criminal courts from the challenges of handling
terrorism matters, and stimulate development of a cadre of investigators,
prosecutors and judges experienced in terrorism and national security matters—similar to the system used in France and Spain, where terrorism cases
are handled by centralized courts. Another variation could involve the adoption of investigative hearing measures similar to those currently under contemplation in Canada, which permit a court to compel the examination of
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See supra text accompanying notes 24, 37–43.
For example, the U.S. government has asserted on several occasions that the President
has inherent constitutional power to detain enemy combatants even in the absence of a congressional authorization to use force such as the AUMF. Cf., e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 513–15
(2003) (discussing both the Government’s argument that the President’s war powers authorize detention of enemy combatants and skepticism that the Government requires a Congressional authorization to detain enemy combatants). The courts have not yet fully resolved that
question.
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any person reasonably believed to have information related to a terrorism
matter.
Let us be clear. We do not urge the consideration of such a system
because we believe that the government officials who designed or operate
under the current multi-prong approach are ill-motivated or purposely distorting the legal authorities under which they operate. To the contrary, we
believe the vast majority have acted in good faith and have done the best
they can with, in the words of Attorney General Mukasey, “a strained and
mismatched legal system.”188 If structured properly, a new security detention system might relieve the pressures currently distorting the existing detention mechanisms and provide a more definite, regular, and widely accepted standard of detention in difficult terrorism cases.
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Michael B. Mukasey, Op-Ed, Jose Padilla Makes Bad Law, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2007,
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